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THE LIABILITY CRISIS-A PERSPECTIVE
SEAN F. MOONEYt
I. THE LIABILITY CRISIS-A PERSPECTIVE
Problems in society, as in people's everyday lives, tend to get
treated only when they reach crisis proportions. Yet, there is a
benefit to this phenomenon. A severe crisis can force the reexam-
ination of fundamental assumptions. Frequently such a review
can result in very positive benefits in the future.
In this paper, the experience of the recent tort liabil-
ity/insurance crisis is reviewed in terms of the fundamental forces
believed to have caused and shaped the crisis. First, some
groundwork is laid on the fundamental concepts behind the cur-
rent tort liability and insurance systems. Second, the dimensions
of the crisis in terms of reduced availability and the increased
price of liability insurance are examined. Third, the causes of the
crisis are then reviewed. Finally, some proposed solutions to the
crisis are discussed.
The perspective taken in this article is grounded in economic
and insurance concepts. Other issues, such as developments in
tort law, are mentioned where relevant, but are not discussed in
depth.
II. THE TORT LIABILITY AND INSURANCE SYSTEMS: SOME
FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS
A. The Tort System
In this section, the tort system is briefly reviewed. Two per-
spectives on the system, the legal and the economic, are
described.
A tort may be generally defined as a private wrong, as distin-
guished from a crime, which is a public wrong. This definition is
useful as an anchor or starting point for discussion.i
t Senior Vice President and Economist, Insurance Information Institute.
B.S., M.S., University College Dublin; Ph.D., U.C.L.A.
1. Although a satisfactory definition of tort is unavailable, "[b]roadly speak-
ing, a tort is a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which the court will
provide a remedy in the form of an action for damages." W. KEETON, D. DOBBS,
R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 1, at 2
(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER].
For a discussion of the difficulty of defining "tort," see SPECIAL COMMrrTEE
(1235)
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In the tort system, it is assumed that accidents will happen;
drivers will go too fast; workers will be careless at times in pro-
ducing or repairing products; doctors will make mistakes in diag-
nosis and treatment. The risk of accidents is inevitable in our
society. Society must determine an optimal level of risk. Clearly,
by requiring all automobiles to travel at a speed less than 25 mph,
risk would be reduced. But this would occur at a large cost to
society, in both economic and physic terms. 2
The legal framework for the tort system does not directly ad-
dress this issue. The foundation of that system is the concept of
justice.
When acts of omissions offend individual rights, the law
prescribes that the offending party pays compensation to the in-
jured party.3 Thus, the system serves the dual roles of compensa-
tion and deterrence. In a sense, it could be said that the legal
system is attempting to be neutral on the broad issue of how
much risk society is prepared to pay for. The basic concern of the
legal approach is with individual rights.4
The economic perspective, a perspective different from the
legal framework, is not neutral on the broad question of the
cost/benefit analysis of risk in society. Indeed, this approach is
grounded in an analysis of costs and benefits. Under this ap-
proach a defendant is guilty of negligence if the loss caused by the
accident, multiplied by the probability of the accident occurring,
exceeds the burden of the precautions that the defendant might
have taken to avert it. 5 For example, suppose a defendant could
prevent an accident of $1000 for a cost of $100. Suppose, also,
that the probability of the accident occurring is 20%. In this case
the cost of preventing the accident, $100, is less than the loss that
ON THE TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM (A.B.A.), TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY:
THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN
TORT LAW 2-7 to -8 (November 1984) [hereinafter SPECIAL COMMITrEE].
2. See, e.g., SPECIAL COMMITrEE, supra note 1, at 4-13. The policy involved is
"not an abstract commitment to reducing accidents but rather that of optimizing
accident costs." Id. Such a view reveals that there must be an economically effi-
cient level of accidents. Id.
3. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 1, at 5-6. This recognized need for compensa-
tion is the primary factor influencing the development of tort law. Id. § 4, at 20.
4. This was not always true in western civilization. Initially, remedies for
tortious harms developed to protect group interest. SPECIAL COMMITrEE, supra
note 1, at 3-1.
5. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947). Judge Learned Hand devised a formula where liability depends upon
whether B < PL, where B is the burden of adequate precautions, P is the
probability of injury and L is the gravity of the injury. Id.
1236 [Vol. 32: p. 1235
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would be caused by the accident multiplied by the probability of
the accident (20% X $1000 = $200). In this instance, the de-
fendant could be viewed as negligent. 6
This economic approach has the advantage of producing, at
least on a surface analysis, an optimal amount of risk prevention
activity. Individuals will be motivated to invest in risk reducing
activities to a point where the expected benefits of risk prevention
activities equals or exceeds the costs of such activities.
These two strands of thought, legal and economic, are criti-
cal to the debate on tort liability. It is not the function of this
article to reconcile these approaches, but rather to use them as a
backdrop toward considering the basic topic-the crisis in tort lia-
bility insurance.
B. Insurance for Liability Risks
The use of insurance for liability risks raises two distinct is-
sues. One is the overall societal issue of whether such insurance
to cover the consequences of wrongful acts is in accord with soci-
etal goals ofjustice and economic welfare. 7 The second is a tech-
nical issue of whether such risks are insurable.
1. Societal Concerns and Liability Insurance
Following the economic approach to tort liability, the imposi-
tion of tort liability is desirable because it encourages the choice
of the lesser of either loss prevention costs or future liability
costs. This forces an internalization to the individual enterprise
of the costs of risk. (Economists view internalization as desirable
because those who are most able to reduce the risk of injury are
given incentive for risk reduction.) However, the insurance
mechanism tends to reduce the impact of the internalization pro-
cess. 8 Not surprisingly, in the early days of liability insurance an
6. For a review of the economic approach to law, see R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 15-23 (2d ed. 1977).
7. For a general discussion of coordinating insurance coverage to serve so-
ciety's needs, see K. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 133-72 (1986). Coordination
of insurance coverage can promote economic efficiency and help achieve desired
distributions of risk. Id. at 136-37.
8. See P. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 14-15 (1985). Danzon uses the
example of the difference between patient-consumers' perceptions and physi-
cians' perceptions of risk. Id. A poorly informed patient may underestimate risk
and underinsure or overestimate risk and overinsure. Id. at 14. A better in-
formed physician, who estimates the risk of injury, will include the expected lia-
bility cost in his fee for services. Id. Therefore, an uninformed consumer who
decides to use the physician's services will be purchasing the optimal amount of
insurance, which is implicit in the fee. Id. at 14-15. Danson theorizes that "plac-
1987] 1237
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argument was made that the use of insurance to transfer liability
was against public policy. In many states, this point of view is still
reflected in the prohibition against insurance for punitive
damages. '
A number of arguments are commonly proposed to defend
the use of insurance for liability risks. First, it is argued that liabil-
ity insurance benefits victims by guaranteeing payment, particu-
larly where the defendant is unable financially to meet the claims
of the injured.' 0 This line of argument is flawed, as it stresses
only the goal of compensation, but does not address the deter-
rence issue. It suggests that society should forego the deterrent
effect of liability. But if deterrence is to be dropped, then a sim-
ple no-fault compensation system would appear to be a more sen-
sible approach. Put another way, if deterrence is not the goal,
then why retain liability?
A stronger line of argument relies on the risk classification
ing liability on producers [physicians] provides a means of correcting the ineffi-
ciencies that would result from consumer misperception of risks." Id. at 15.
9. States which reject insurance coverage of punitive damages generally do
so because such coverage is contrary to public policy. See American Sur. Co. of
New York v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523, 526-27 (10th Cir. 1966) (predicting Kansas law
would prohibit coverage for public policy reasons); Northwestern Nat'l Casualty
Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 441-42 (5th Cir. 1962) (interpreting Florida and
Virginia law that insurance for punitive damages violates public policy); Gleason
v. Fryer, 30 Colo. App. 106, 109, 491 P.2d 85, 86 (1971) (coverage of punitive
damages denied under contract language); Brown v. Western Casualty & Sur.
Co., 484 P.2d 1252, 1253 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971) (coverage of punitive damages
denied under contract language); Nicholson v. American Fire & Casualty Ins.
Co., 177 So. 2d 52, 54 (Fla. Ct. App. 1965) (permitting insurance for punitive
damages contravenes public policy); Caspersen v. Webber, 298 Minn. 93, 100,
213 N.W.2d 327, 331 (1973) (coverage of punitive damages denied under con-
tract language); Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17, 23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964) (insurance
for punitive damages violates public policy); LoRocco v. New Jersey Mfrs. In-
dem. Ins. Co., 82 N.J. Super. 323, 332, 197 A.2d 591, 596 (App. Div.) (insurance
for punitive damages violates public policy), cert. denied, 42 N.J. 144, 199 A.2d
655 (1964); Teska v. Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co., 59 Misc. 2d 615, 619, 300 N.Y.S.2d
375, 379 (Dist. Ct. 1969) (public policy prohibits insurers from liability for puni-
tive damages).
In McNulty, Judge Wisdom reasoned:
Where a person is able to insure himself against punishment he gains a
freedom of misconduct inconsistent with the establishment of sanctions
against such misconduct. It is not disputed that insurance against crim-
inal fines or penalties would be void as violative of public policy. The
same public policy should invalidate any contract of insurance against
the civil punishment that punitive damages represent.
307 F.2d at 440.
10. See generally 1 R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 109, at 1-37
(1987). The standard liability insurance policy contains a provision that requires
the insurer to pay claims even when the insured is insolvent or bankrupt. Id.
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and other aspects of the operation of the insurance mechanism. '
Insurance pricing is based on individual and class experience. A
twenty-three year old male is charged an auto insurance rate
which reflects his age category and also his personal driving rec-
ord. As a result, this driver has the incentive of reduced premi-
ums to avoid accidents. In the commercial area, the use of rating
plans greatly adds to a firm's ability to control its premium costs
through risk control techniques. The insurance mechanism does
retain the deterrent effect of the liability system.
The risk classification system also plays a key role in control-
ling the adverse selection problem endemic to all non-compul-
sory insurance mechanisms. If insurance rates are based on a
wide variety of high and low risks, then the low risk policyholders
will be paying more than their appropriate share, and high risk
policyholders will be paying less than their appropriate share.
Hence, low risk members may be motivated to drop out of the
system. When this problem becomes severe, the insurance mech-
anism breaks down. The finer the classification system the less
likely low risk policyholders will feel that they are paying too
much for their coverage. This, in turn, reduces the adverse selec-
tion problem. These issues will be revisited later in this article. 12
Another reason for why the insurance mechanism does not
totally eliminate deterrence is that insurance payments rarely
cover the whole of the financial and other costs associated with a
liability claim. For example, a single injury as a result of a defec-
tive product can ruin a product line and seriously damage a firm's
reputation. In defending claims, companies incur many other
costs beyond legal defense and injury compensation (covered by
insurance), such as employees' and managers' time both in court
and in preparing a defense. In medical malpractice cases, the
psychic impact of a lawsuit can be even more devastating than the
size of the compensation sought.13
A further line of reasoning stresses the value to society of
increased economic activity as a result of the risk spreading insur-
ance mechanism. Without liability insurance, many entrepre-
neurs would be deterred from going into business because a
single lawsuit could wipe out their invested capital and, in some
11. For a discussion of risk classification and insurance pricing, see K.
ABRAHAM, supra note 7, at 64-100.
12. For a further discussion of adverse selection, see infra text following
note 61.
13. A Doctor on Trial, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1986, § 6, at 26.
19871 1239
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cases, their own wealth.14 However, this line of reasoning, which
stresses the value of insurance, does not explain how the insur-
ance mechanism can maintain the risk deterrence features of the
liability system.
2. Can All Liability Risks Be Insured?
There are a couple of key characteristics of an insurable risk.
The first characteristic of an insurable risk is "calculability,"
meaning that a statistical estimate can be made of the average size
and frequency of loss. 15 In general, this means that there are a
large number of similar losses, such as fires, which occur in-
dependent of one another. A second characteristic of insurable
risks is that they be not excessively catastrophic. Not every large
loss can be insured. Traditional examples of catastrophic losses
are nuclear and war risks. However, the concept is relative. What
is catastrophic to a small insurance company could be common-
place for a large company.
In the liability area, legal liability for auto accidents satisfies
the basic criteria for an insurable risk. This risk has been insured
since the early days of auto travel. In the broad commercial area,
the legal liability of product manufacturers, landlords, contractors
and most other businesses traditionally have been regarded as in-
surable risks. As will be developed further on, a key factor in the
liability crisis in terms of the basic characteristics of calculability
and not excessively catastrophic, were changes which rendered
many of these risks uninsurable.' 6
This review of the major elements of tort liability insurance
shows it to be an uneasy mixture of social concerns and goals.
When one adds in uncertainty and the lack of precision associated
with forecasting the future, the picture gets more muddled.
Given this aspect of a confused philosophical basis, it is not
surprising that the current system reflects this mixture of theoret-
ical and practical concerns. In the area of tort liability of an em-
ployer towards employees, the tort system has been replaced by a
no-fault compensation system. Third-party liability insurance in
auto insurance has been reduced or replaced by no-fault insur-
14. See generally R. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 46-48 (1980)
(evaluating argument that strict liability is justified because manufacturer can
obtain insurance against risk and pass on cost to purchasers of products).
15. See generally D. BICKELHAUPT, GENERAL INSURANCE 12-14 (1979).
16. For a discussion of those changes which rendered some risks uninsur-
able, see infra notes 18-50 and accompanying text.
1240 [Vol. 32: p. 1235
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ance in many states. The diversity of the system reflects the diver-
sity of societal concerns and interests in this field.
III. THE LIABILITY INSURANCE CRISIS
A. The Dimensions
In mid-1984, insurance companies began to raise premiums
significantly for commercial liability insurance policies. At the
same time, companies began to cut back coverage on renewal pol-
icies and pull back from offering liability insurance in a number of
areas. These events constitute what came to be called the "liabil-
ity insurance crisis." The problems of rising prices and lack of
availability of coverage persisted through 1985 and at least the
first half of 1986. At the present time (February 1987), most ana-
lysts believe that price increases are more moderate and that lia-
bility insurance for most exposures is readily available.17
The liability insurance crisis had two dimensions-price and
availability. The best measure readily available of price change is
the change in total written premiums. This measure is used be-
cause there is no such thing as an average or typical price for
commercial liability insurance, due to the fact that there is no
such thing as an average or typical liability exposure. Each busi-
ness pays a premium based on a number of factors such as type of
industry, location, sales volume, claims record, loss control pro-
gram and other insurance policies already in place.' 8
Changes in written premiums reflect changes in price and
volume (risks covered). In general, the number of businesses re-
quiring insurance increases at a slow rate, so that the volume of
risks covered increases at a rate not much faster than the overall
economy. This means that when there are large changes in writ-
ten premiums, it can be readily assumed that most of the change
is due to price.
The following table details the changes in commercial liabil-
ity insurance premiums in 1983, 1984, 1985 and 1986.
17. See Glaberson, Liability Rates Flattening Out as Crisis Eases, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 9, 1987, at 1, col. 5.
18. The general liability line of insurance alone has about 2,000 separate
classifications by type of industry. When one adds in the extra factor of location
alone, the number of separate rates possible approaches 100.000.
1987] 1241
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Percent Change From Prior Year 19
General Liability20  Medical Malpractice
1983 0.2 5.1
1984 14.4 14.3
1985 79.0 55.2
1986(est) 72.5 29.0
As the table shows, premiums for general liability increased by
over 70% both in 1985 and 1986. In medical malpractice the in-
crease in 1985 was 55.2% and was 29.0% in 1986.
During the critical period, liability coverage was difficult to
obtain or unavailable in a number of selected areas. These in-
cluded liability coverage for day-care, municipalities, liquor liabil-
ity for taverns and restaurants and pollution exposures.
B. What Factors Were Involved in the Insurance Liability Crisis?
To search for exact causality in the insurance crisis is proba-
bly a pointless exercise. Two major factors and a number of mi-
nor factors were involved. The major factors were:
1. the expansion of tort law, and
2. the insurance cycle.
The minor factors included the discovery and subsequent
media blitz concerning child abuse in day care centers, the growth
in litigation and campaign against driving under the influence
(DWI), 2 1 the federal superfund law22 and the increasing use of
19. A.M. BEST & Co., AGGREGATES AND AVERAGES (1986).
20. This category, general liability, covers policies written for businesses to
cover only their liability risks. Many businesses purchase package policies,
which cover many risks such as fire, wind, theft and also liability. Data on these
policies are collected under a category known as commercial multiperil.
21. In 1982, Congress passed the Alcohol Traffic Safety Act of 1982, which
created a three-year federal program that provided grants to states that adopted
effective programs to reduce traffic safety problems resulting from persons driv-
ing while intoxicated. 23 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1982, Supp. II 1984 & Supp. III
1985). For a general discussion of recent developments that have emerged to
control drunk drivers, see Pearl, The Party"s Over: Controlling Drmk Drivers, 17
URBs. LAw. 813 (1985).
22. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982, Supp. 11 1984 & Supp. III 1985)
[hereinafter CERCLA]. CERCLA is commonly called the Superfund Act. The
purpose of CERCLA is "to provide for a national inventory of inactive hazard-
ous waste sites and to establish a program for appropriate environmental re-
sponse action to protect public health and the environment from the dangers
posed by such sites." H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, 17, re-
prittted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6119.
1242 [Vol. 32: p. 1235
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the joint and several liability doctrine against municipalities. 2 3
1. The Growth in Litigation and Expansion of Tort Law
From the viewpoint of the insurance industry, there has been
an expansion in tort law in recent decades. Incurred losses24 in
general liability insurance over the past twenty years have in-
creased 2,663%, a much faster rate than comparable indicators.
For example, between 1965 and 1986 GNP rose 445%,25 overall
prices increased 238%,26 the cost of medical care rose 366%27
and population increased 23%.28
More specifically relevant to the crisis was the growth in in-
curred losses in 1984 and 1985. In those two years, losses in-
creased 24% and 54%, respectively, compared with an annual
average at 7% in the prior five years. 29
Data on jury awards30 and selected studies of other courts3 I
also show rapid expansion of the system. Outside the insurance
industry, data on paid losses from self-insured entities, e.g., New
York City,32 State of California 33 and medical malpractice mutuals
show comparably strong growth.3 4
Related to the rise in claim losses was a change in many legal
doctrines, placing more emphasis on the compensation of injured
For a comprehensive review of litigation under CERCLA, see Anderson,
Negotiation and Informal Agency Action: The Case of Superfund, 1985 DUKE L.J. 261.
23. INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, DATA BASE REPORTS: MUNICIPAL
LIABILITY 2, 6-7 (Oct. 1987).
24. Incurred losses for a given year are defined as losses paid or reserves
set up for insured occurrences in that year.
25. Economic Report of the President, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 244 (1987) (Table
B-1). GNP rose from $772 billion in 1966 to $4,208.5 billion in 1986. Id.
26. Id. at 307 (table B-55). The Consumer Price Index rose from 97.2 in
1966 to 328.4 in 1986. Id.
27. Id.
28. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1987 8 (107th ed. 1987). The population in-
creased from 196,560,000 in 1966 to 241,489,000 in 1986. Id.
29. A.M. BEST & Co., AGGREGATES AND AVERAGES (1986).
30. SeeJURY VERDICT RESEARCH, INC., 1 PERSONAL INJURY VALUATION HAND-
BOOKS (1986).
31. See, e.g., The Des Moines Register, Sept. 17, 1986, at I (National Center
for State Courts showed that in Iowa courts average awards increased 163%
between 1980 and 1984, while personal injury suits fell only 1%).
32. See New York City Mayor's Report on Instrance Claims Settled Fiscal
Years 1977-1986 (1987).
33. Letter from James K. Hahn, Assistant City Attorney for the City of Los
Angeles, to M.A. Firneo (Sept. I, 1987).
34. INSTITUTE FOR CIVILJusTICE, NEW EVIDENCE ON FREQUENCY AND SEVER-
r1v OF MEDICAL. MALPRACTICE CLAIMS (1986).
1987] 1243
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persons. The doctrinal changes include shifting burdens of proof
as to causation, changing apportionment of damages, the market
share liability concept and joint and several liability for independ-
ent tortfeasors.3 5
It will be argued in the following section that the spectacular
growth in liability claims would have by itself led to a crisis, ab-
sent the impacts of record high interest rates and the insurance
cycle. However, the changes in legal doctrines reviewed strike at
the very heart of the insurance liability process. This is because
they tend to destroy the classification and rating structure of in-
surance. If the potential liability of a company or other entity
bears little relationship to its own loss control activities, or its loss
experience, then the insurance premium can bear little relation-
ship to these factors. Thus, the policyholder has no incentive
within the insurance mechanism to improve safety. As a result of
these legal doctrines, some authors state that the insurance mech-
anism could be viewed as contrary to societal goals as it precludes
businesses from facing the most severe financial consequences of
wrongful acts and the risk rating defense of insurance, as re-
viewed earlier, does not hold.3 6
2. Insurance Cycles
The basic factor behind the large price increases in commer-
cial liability insurance in 1985 and 1986 was a six-year period of
intense price competition in this line of insurance. During the
period of 1978 to 1984, premiums for commercial general liabil-
ity insurance showed no increase at all, despite the fact that the
inflation rate for this period averaged 8% per annum and claim
losses increased by a total of 72%. This period was triggered by
high interest rates, peaking at over 20% for the prime rate in
1981 .7 The incentive of increased investment income from high
interest rates led a period of deep price cutting.3 8
35. K. ABRAHAM, supra note 7, at 49.
36. For a further discussion of the insurance mechanism, see supra notes 8-
14 and accompanying text. For a current presentation of the view that the insur-
ance mechanism is contrary to societal goals, see Priest, Tort-Reforin Legislation
... Is Only a Start, Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 1987, at 26, col. 5.
37. Economic Report of the President, supra note 25, at 324 (table B-68).
38. The interest rate factor alone would have caused wide gyrations in the
price of liability insurance, absent other considerations of excessive competition
and developments in tort law.
In general liability, only 50% of claims are paid five years following the year
the policy is written. To see the impact of interest rates consider a loss of $100
which is to be paid five years from now.
[Vol. 32: p. 12351244
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Would there have been a crisis if interest rates had stayed flat
and insurance companies had not entered this period of cut-
throat competition? An analysis of the data would indicate yes.
Between 1978 and 1986 claim losses in general liability in-
creased by 277.5%, or, at an annual average rate of 18.1%. If
insurance companies had raised prices by 18.1% per year for
every one of the last 8 years, at a time when inflation averaged
6.5% and even medical care increases averaged only 8.25%
would not this have been regarded as a severe problem, if not a
crisis? Over the same period the increase in the costs of medical
care was regarded as a crisis, triggering cost control action by the
federal government and strong moves toward cost sharing and
other cost control mechanisms by private insurers.3 9
Why were insurance companies myopic about the impact of
deep price cutting? The industry is highly competitive. As invest-
ment income was observed to increase, individual companies
were motivated to cut prices and to try to increase their market
shares. This was sensible from the point of view of the individual
insurance company. It was also sensible from society's perspec-
tive. Here, the "invisible hand" of Adam Smith's market was at
work. Each individual company "intends only his own gain and
he is in this, .. . led by an invisible hand to promote an end which
was no part of his intention." 40 The end promoted in this in-
stance was the passing through of increased investment income
To cover such a loss, when interest rates are 5%, an insurance company
would break even with a premium of $80.
Premium needed to cover a loss of $100 five years in future
Interest Rate 1980 Premium 1985 Loss
5% $80 $100
20% $40 $100
If interest rates increase from 5% to 20%, then the premium would fall to
$40, a 50% decline. On the other hand, as interest rates decrease from 20% to
5%, the premium would go up by 100%. So if insurance companies were ob-
served to lower their prices by 50% as interest rates increased, and raise them by
100% as interest rates fell these gyrations would be totally justified. Hence,
large gyrations in insurance prices would have occurred in the 1980's based on
interest rate movements alone.
39. See Note, Rethinking Aledical Malpractice Law in Light of ledicare Cost-Cut-
ting, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1004 (1985) (cost-cutting initiatives conflict with incen-
tives of physicians under current malpractice law)..
40. F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE 9 (2d ed. 1980) (quoting A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND
CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 423 (1937)).
1987] 1245
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from higher interest rates to policyholders in the form of lower
insurance rates, a very desirable social objective.
A second factor behind the apparent myopia of underwriters
was the unfamiliarity of insurance companies with the use of price
as a competitive tool in commercial liability markets. The insur-
ance industry over the past forty years has evolved from a market
climate where price and product were tightly regulated 4' to a
much looser regulatory environment. Industries have had a
tough time adjusting from a system of rigid price controls to the
free-for-all of price competition. The airline and trucking indus-
tries are examples of industries which moved from a strict price
regulatory environment to a competitive market. Both of these
industries have had a difficult passage to a new market environ-
ment and consumers have seen many rapid oscillations in price
and service.
Some critics of the industry have asserted that the problems
were caused by mistakes of insurance companies. 42 They assert
that insurance companies failed to foresee-as did most ana-
lysts-the deflation and consequent decline in interest rates in the
first half of the 1980's. As a result, critics asserted that insurance
companies grossly underpriced their product and are now re-
quired to raise prices to recover from this mistake. This makes
some sense, but does not square with the basic data, which shows
an increase, not only in investment income over the whole period,
but also in the rate of return on investments.
41. See Stewart, Reflection on 40 Years: Changes that Shaped an Industry, INS.
REV. 25 (May/June 1984).
42. See, e.g., COALITION FOR CONSUMER JUSTICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
(1986).
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3. Return on Investments
New Investment Income as Percent of Assets
43
New Investment
Income as Percent Interest Rate on
of Assets of Stock High Grade
Companies Municipal Bonds Prime Interest Rate
1978 5.27 5.90 9.06
1979 5.97 6.39 12.67
1980 6.02 8.51 15.27
1981 6.37 11.23 18.87
1982 6.79 11.57 14.86
1983 6.58 9.47 10.79
1984 6.91 10.15 12.04
As this table shows, the investment income return steadily in-
creased from 1978 through 1982. It declined slightly in 1983 and
increased again in 1984, just as interest rates declined in 1983
and rose in 1984. Basically the rate of return tracked the interest
yield on municipal bonds-the preferred asset of prop-
erty/casualty insurance companies.
Thus, the notion that insurance companies bet on high inter-
est rates continuing into the future, and, are now faced with an
overall declining investment income, is not borne out by the data.
Therefore, assertions that insurance companies are raising prices
to make up for reduced investment income due to mistaken fore-
casts on interest rates are invalid.
4. Changes in Incurred Losses
It does appear likely, however, that insurance companies mis-
judged the accelerated growth in liability claims in the 1980's.
This can be seen by examining the breakdown of incurred losses.
Arithmetically, incurred losses for a given year can be broken
down into paid losses plus changes in reserves. 44 The yearly in-
43. A.M. BEST & Co., AGGREGATES AND AVERAGES (data in first column):
Economic Report of President, supra note 25, at 324 (table B-68) (data in last two
columns).
44. Incurred losses are losses allocated to pay claims for occurrences in a
given year. Some of these losses will be paid in the year and the remainder will
be added to reserves. To see how incurred losses equal paid losses plus changes
in reserves requires some algebra.
Let: L, be incurred losses in period t,
R, be reserves at the start of period t, and R,+, be reserves at the end of
period t.
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creases in these categories and in total incurred losses are shown
in the following table.
General Liability (including medical malpractice)45
Paid Additions to Total Incurred
Losses Reserves Losses
1978 12.4% 3.5% 7.6%
1979 20.4 12.8 16.5
1980 22.4 1.8 12.0
1981 20.8 (1.6) 10.6
1982 19.8 9.5 15.6
1983 21.4 (9.6) 9.5
1984 24.2 45.8 31.1
What is immediately evident from these data is that paid losses
which represent dollars actually paid out in claims had been
growing at a steady rate of approximately 20% since 1978. How-
ever, additions to reserves shows no such parallel increase. What
might have occurred is that actuaries believed that the large in-
creases in paid losses were unusual. As a result, they underesti-
mated additions to reserves and, in fact, in certain years
decreased the amount added to reserves from the prior year.
Why did actuaries apparently believe the paid loss data were
reflecting a transitory phenomenon? No definitive answer can be
Let: PL, be paid losses in period t.
PL, = PL' + I PL (equation 1),
i=l
where PLt' refers to paid losses in period t for claims arising in a prior period
t-i.
= A R' + PL t (equation 2), where A R in period t is the increased
reserves due to losses for events occurring in period t.
Let A R, = - R, (equation 3)
= R, + AR - PL (equation 4),
meaning that reserves at the end of period t are made up of reserves at the start
of period t, plus the additions to reserves in period t less losses paid against
reserves set up in prior years. Substituting equation 1 in equation 4 yields:
R,+, = R + AR' - PL, + PL'
But PL = L, - AR: (from equation 2)
Therefore: R,,, = R, + AR, - PL, + L, - ARt = R, - PL, + L,
Hence: L, = R,+, - R, + PL, = AR, + PL,
45. Letter from D. Crifo, Insurance Services Office, Inc., to Sean F. Mooney
(Mar. 3, 1986).
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given. It should be borne in mind that the liability insurance in-
dustry had come through a tough period in the mid-1970's. Fol-
lowing this period, loss growth slowed, and perhaps, actuaries
were inclined to believe that this period of slow growth in claims
losses would persist.
5. Other Factors
The growth in litigation and the insurance cycle go a long
way toward explaining the rapid swings in the price of liability
insurance. However, they do not fully explain why insurance be-
came unavailable in some lines and readily available in others.
A number of special factors entered into the picture to shape
the availability aspects of the crisis. These factors can be grouped
into three broad categories:
1. factors external to the liability and insurance
systems;
2. factors peculiar to the liability system; and
3. factors specific to the insurance industry.
a. External Factors
In the area of day-care, a number of child abuse scandals in
day-care facilities were reported. The publicity surrounding
these cases affected politicians, parents, law enforcement officials
and, not surprisingly, underwriters. The day-care line had been
losing money for a number of years, and thus was an obvious area
to eliminate coverage for companies who were attempting to limit
their liability exposure. In this line, premiums were low. In some
cases coverage was added to other policies, with no rate change
whatsoever. Additionally, a major national insurer of day-care
centers, Mission Insurance, had severe financial difficulties and fi-
nally was declared insolvent.
It could clearly be argued that there would have been a crisis
in day care, absent the other factors in the tort and insurance cy-
cle. But such a conclusion would be impossible to prove.
The drive against drunk driving began in full swing in 1982.
Over the ensuing years, the liability of servers of alcohol in the
case of restaurants and for accidents caused by patrons or guests
in case of social hosts was increasingly asserted in the courts. 4"
46. See, e.g., Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 559-60, 476 A.2d 1219, 1230
(1984) (guest host liable for foreseeable consequences to third parties that result
from guest's drunken driving); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau
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Again this line of insurance had not exactly been a sterling profit
performer over the years. For many restaurants the coverage was
added as a low cost endorsement to a more comprehensive pol-
icy. It could be argued also in this case that the availability
problems would have occurred absent the impact of the tort law
developments and cyclical forces.
Similarly, unrelated social factors impacted on availability in
other categories.
1. The farm crisis appears to have led to an increase in
rural arson, which, in turn, led to a cutback in rural
homeowners coverage; 47
2. The federal superfund law of 1980 has had a contin-
uing chilling effect on the market for pollution cov-
erages;48 and
3. The deregulation of the trucking industry is believed
to be responsible for a significant increase in acci-
dents involving trucks. 49
b. Special Liability Problems
The availability problems of municipalities arose from
changes within the tort system itself, particularly the erosion of
sovereign immunity and the expanded use of the joint and several
liability doctrine for independent tortfeasors against municipali-
ties. 50 Again, while these factors were not external to the tort sys-
tem, they had a special impact on municipalities, distinct from
other sectors of society.
c. Special Insurance Industry Problems
A number of exogenous events impacted on the United
States insurance industry in the crisis period. Although in and of
Omego Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 639, 485 P.2d 18, 21 (1971) (circumstances may
exist where host has duty to deny guest further access to alcohol).
For a comprehensive review of social host liability for intoxicated guests,
see Special Project, Social Host Liability for the Negligent Acts of Intoxicated Guests, 70
CORNELL L. REV. 1058 (1985).
47. INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, DATA BASE REPORTS: ARSON 4
(Oct. 1987).
48. INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, DATA BASE REPORTS: ENVIRONMEN-
TAL POLLUTION 7-9 (Oct. 1987) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION].
49. INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, DATA BASE REPORTS: AUTO SAFETY
6-8 (Oct. 1987).
50. INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, DATA BASE REPORTS: MUNICIPAL
LIABILITY 1-8 (Oct. 1987) [hereinafter MUNICIPAL LIABILITY].
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themselves these factors could not have caused the crisis, they did
shape the nature of the crisis.
The insolvency of Mission Insurance-a major writer of day-
care insurance-caused a major problem in this field. Losses in
the day-care area were only a minor factor in the financial collapse
of Mission. Financial troubles and scandals at Lloyds of London
led to reduced availability of coverages in such selected areas as
municipalities and recreation facilities. The events at Lloyds and
Mission did not cause the crisis. In a normal market competitors
would have moved immediately to fill the void caused by the with-
drawal of coverage in each case. Indeed, as financial conditions in
the industry improved, other companies did move to fill the gaps
caused by these special circumstances.
IV. SOLUTIONS TO THE LIABILITY INSURANCE CRISIS
A. Temporary Measures
The problems caused by the tort liability insurance crisis
were dealt with in a number of ways in 1985 and 1986. The key
problem of availability was addressed in many states by Market
Assistance Plans (MAPs), where insurance companies agreed on a
voluntary basis to provide coverage in areas where availability was
perceived as a key problem.
However, looking at the longer term, what options are avail-
able to avoid a repeat of the 1984/85 experience? Two areas
need to be reviewed-insurance regulation and the changes in the
civil justice system.
1. Controlling the Insurance Cycle
Looking first at the insurance industry, there is no question
that the insurance cycle was a major factor causing the gyrations
in pricing and availability that occurred in commercial liability in-
surance. How can the regulatory system be changed to prevent
such gyrations in the future? A number of points need to be em-
phasized before an answer can be found.
Throughout its recorded history the property/casualty insur-
ance industry has been cyclical. Basic economic forces have
driven the cycles and so any attempt to control or smooth the
cycle should take account of these forces.
Fundamentally, society has decided that in most cases prop-
erty/casualty insurance should be provided by the private sector.
There are benefits to society from utilizing the private sector-the
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profit motive provides for flexibility, innovation and development
of new products. In addition, the competitive system usually
means that the product or service is produced at a lower cost to
the consumer than would occur under a government monopoly.
However, for many products or services the competitive system
produces cycles, e.g., housing, autos and steel.5 '
In the insurance industry the cycles reflect the basic econom-
ics of the demand/supply balance. Demand for insurance is rela-
tively fixed as people normally buy only one auto policy or one
homeowners' policy per year. On the other hand, supply is varia-
ble. In particular, entrance into the industry is relatively easy. So
the basic economic landscape of supply and demand of the indus-
try leads to cycles. When returns in the industry look good, new
capital enters, prices fall, but demand does not expand propor-
tionally. As a result, an imbalance between supply and demand
occurs, profits fall and insolvencies develop. Eventually there is a
shakeout and a return to a "hard" market, where prices stabilize
and coverage in certain areas may be difficult to find. In technical
economic terms, demand for insurance is relatively inelastic-un-
responsive to price, while supply is elastic-responsive to price.
The agricultural industry has similar characteristics. Demand
for food is relatively fixed, while supply varies with the weather
and other factors. This leads to cycles. Since 1913, the federal
government has attempted to stabilize agricultural markets. Cur-
rently over $12,000 per farmer is spent on federal subsidies and
the industry still displays extreme cyclicality.5 2 Consequently,
proposals for increased regulation as "solutions to the cycle"
should be reviewed with caution.
The varying nature of the insurance cycle also needs to be
considered in framing a regulatory response in the insurance
field. Each cycle has different characteristics.
For example, in the 1970's, the most volatile line of insur-
ance was auto insurance. In the period from 1968 to 1978, of the
eighteen major property/casualty insurance companies, the two
companies which showed most cyclicality were State Farm and
GEICO, both prominent auto insurers. The companies with the
least cyclicality were Crum & Forster and Travelers, both major
commercial lines underwriters.
A study by Conning & Co. published in 1979 concluded that
51. See FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., The Cycle in Property/Casualty Insur-
ance, 11 Q REV. 22 (Autumn 1986).
52. See id.
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strict regulation of price in private passenger automobiles was a
major cause of cyclicality.53 This contrasts with the latest cycle,
where many have suggested that tighter regulation of price would
have prevented the cycle from developing.
A number of unique factors combined to create and shape
the 1984/85 liability crisis. These included record high interest
rates, the relative inexperience of companies in the use of price as
a competitive tool and the rapid growth in litigation. A regula-
tory response designed to deal with the symptoms caused by
these factors, namely volatile prices and shortages, would be in-
appropriate. To begin with, there is a low probability that inter-
est rates will be in the 20% to 30% range in the near future.
Companies are now more experienced and comfortable with the
use of price as a competitive tool. Insurance companies are also
better equipped to handle the current unpredictable and explo-
sive liability environment than they were previously. The use of
the claims-made policies, increased use of aggregate limits and
more experienced underwriters-all help to decrease volatility in
the market.
Given these considerations of the inevitability of cycles and
the futility of attempting to solve yesterday's symptoms without
addressing root causes, are there any clear lessons for regulators
from the liability crisis?
One clear area in which improvements could be made is in
information. During the intense period of competition, regula-
tors and market participants had no clear information on how far
prices had actually fallen. The price for liability insurance is not
easily defined. Therefore, regulators rely mainly on annual data
on premiums and rate filings to determine financial security.
Without clear information on how low prices had gone, it was dif-
ficult for regulators to "jaw-bone" or talk the market into ade-
quate pricing. This suggests the need for the development of
price indices for liability insurance or, perhaps, some special
types of market conduct studies to provide measures of price
cutting.
In the latest cycle, it was obvious that manual rates as filed
were too high, given the record high interest rates. Price cutting
was needed and desirable from a regulatory and societal perspec-
tive. But how deep had prices fallen? The degree of decline can
be calculated actuarially with suitable conservative forecasts on
53. CONNING & Co., A STUDY OF WHY UNDERWRITING CYCLES OCCUR
(1979).
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interest rates. However, even if regulators knew what the decline
should be, for example, 20% in a given line of business, the data
they gathered provided no simple indication as to whether com-
panies had cut prices by more or less than this figure. Thus, there
is a need for more useful price information. This could be satis-
fied by the development of a price index (along the lines of the
consumer price index for auto insurance) or through a review of a
company's books. A random sample of the prices charged to the
same policyholders from one year to the next would indicate
movements in overall prices. Collecting data along those lines
would be much cheaper and much more directed toward problem
solving than many other proposals for massive data collection
that have been floated at the state and federal levels.
Despite the absence of the velvet or iron glove of the regula-
tor, the provision of data on overall price trends probably would
smooth the operations of the market. Perfect information is re-
garded by economists as a condition for the smooth operation of
markets. 54 During the price cutting period in the first half of the
1980's, individual companies faced with price cutting by competi-
tors had a basic choice-fight or flee. However, while each indi-
vidual company had good information on price cutting as it
affected its own policyholders, it could not be sure that the price
competition it faced represented the temporary raiding actions of
its own competitors or a broad market trend toward below cost
pricing.
If overall price indices had been available then individual
companies would have known that the industry as a whole was
moving to an unprofitable pricing level and could have chosen
flight rather than fight. Such early defection from the price cut-
ting whirlpool could have slowed and perhaps ameliorated the
downturn.
B. Improvements in the Civil Justice System
Turning now to the measures proposed to improve the civil
justice system, changes have been suggested in two major areas.
The first involves more use of alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms (ADR) such as arbitration, mediation, mini-trials, etc.
The fundamental assumption here is that litigants are currently
using the tort system for resolving disputes. Proponents of ADR
54. See F.M. SCHERER, supra note 40, at 11. Perfect knowledge of both pres-
ent and future market conditions is one of several characteristics necessary for
perfect competition. Id.
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argue that the tort system was not designed to resolve disputes. 55
It was not designed to split differences. It was designed to bring
tort feasors to justice-to make them pay for what they had done
wrong. This would mean that injured parties would receive com-
pensation and that wrongdoing in society would be deterred.
The old doctrine of contributory negligence perhaps conveys best
the orientation of the tort system. 56 By requiring that a plaintiff
have zero fault in order to recover, the tort system was clearly
signalling that it was not a dispute settling-split the difference-
system. So proponents of ADR suggest that disputes be taken out
of the courtroom context, with its emphasis on contention and
argumentation.
The insurance industry has utilized ADR for many years. In-
deed, within the insurance industry, ADR is the basic method of
resolving disputes, rather than litigation.
The second measure to improve the civil justice system is the
area of tort reform. The following set of criteria is suggested for
evaluating the various tort reform measures that have in recent
years been proposed and indeed passed in many states. These
four criteria are justice, predictability, cost and efficiency. Follow-
ing a review of these criteria, the four tort reform measures pro-
posed by the insurance industry in 1987 will be analyzed in the
context of these criteria.
Looking first at justice, it is necessary to start with at least a
working definition of the term. The dictionary gives one defini-
tion of justice as "the moral principle determining just con-
duct." 57 This definition allows much latitude in interpretation.
More precise definitions are available but all have certain draw-
backs. For example, a fairly precise definition was available under
Roman law. Justice, in the time of the Roman Empire, was de-
55. INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, DATA BASE REPORTS: CIVIL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 7-13 (Oct. 1987) [hereinafter CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM].
56. Contributory negligence is "conduct on the part of the plaintiff, con-
tributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the stan-
dard to which he is required to conform for his own protection." PROSSER, supra
note 1, § 65, at 451. The defense of contributory negligence is viewed as the
plaintiff's disability rather than the defendant's innocence. Id. at 452.
The defense of contributory negligence has been limited. Where the de-
fendant's conduct was intentional or reckless, where the defendant violated a
statute intended to protect the plaintiff and others similarly situated and where
the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the accident, the plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence does not bar his recovery. V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE § 1.2(A) (2d ed. 1986).
57. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 776
(1966).
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fined as the set and constant purpose of respecting the rights of
others, where these rights had in turn been assigned by the social
order.5 However, this is a very "status quo" oriented definition,
and would leave no room for the development of case-based com-
mon law.
To avoid a continuing and tautologous discussion, perhaps
the easiest way out of a possible legal, philosophical and semantic
morass is to simply review tort reform measures in terms of
whether they severely restrict people's rights. If a given legal rule
is viewed as severely restricting an injured person's rights (how-
ever loosely defined) then it can be regarded as unjust. For exam-
ple, a cap of $80,000 on all liability awards would be viewed by
most people as unjust under this standard.
The criterion of predictability goes to the heart of the work-
ings of the insurance process. Priest has argued that the develop-
ments in tort law toward an enterprise liability concept have been
the basic cause of the insurance crisis. 59 This is not the viewpoint
adopted here, but it is not necessarily inconsistent. The actual
crisis was characterized by a number of special causes such as
high interest rates, child abuse scandals, as well as developments
in tort law. However, one could argue that absent all these spe-
cial factors a crisis would have occurred because of the trend to-
ward enterprise liability, as Priest theorized. 60
The insurance mechanism is based on predictability. In the
area of fire insurance, in a given year, a number of home fires
occur, resulting in a quantifiable dollar loss. If this figure is
$100,000 per 1,000 homes, then an insurance premium (assum-
ing no expenses) of $100 can be set for each home. This process
will work as long as the loss of $100,000 is predictable, meaning
that it can be estimated by standard statistical techniques.
Priest argues that the courts have explicitly moved to a com-
pensation orientation of liability. Under this view, accidents that
occur need to be compensated. Businesses purchase insurance to
cover these liabilities. Essentially, the system is viewed as first
party insurance-like health insurance-where the coverage is
purchased by another party. Priest calls this orientation of the
courts enterprise liability. He argues that this approach is des-
tined to collapse as it forces a breakdown in the risk classification
58. R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 36 (1954).
59. Priest, supra note 36.
60. Id.
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system.3'
The predictability of a risk depends on a number of items,
but the key factor is the number of exposures covered. In the
example of fires, the number of exposures is 1,000 homes. Con-
sider, then, the situation where 500 of these homes are within a
mile of the local fire station and 500 are at a distance of over five
miles away from the station. The homeowners who are close to
the fire station will feel that they are overcharged, while the
homeowners who are farther away from the station will have a
major incentive to stay in the insurance pool, as their higher risk
is being subsidized by the rest of the pool. The attraction to an
insurance pool of high risk exposures is known as adverse selec-
tion. If the 500 homeowners close to the fire station drop out, the
premiums for the remaining homeowners will rise and the pre-
dictability of the system will decline as the population size is
smaller. One can build a scenario where more defections occur,
based on other factors such as the type of construction and value
of the home. Ultimately such a system can break down.
Insurance companies counter the problem of adverse selec-
tion through the risk classification system. In the example, the
500 homeowners close to the fire house would be charged a lower
rate, based on their more favorable loss experience. The devel-
opments in tort law away from a fault based system hinder the
insurance mechanism by reducing the ability of the system to
classify risks. For example, under the superfund law's rules on
liability, a dry cleaner can be exposed to the same pollution risks
as a disposer of hazardous wastes. 62
But developments in tort law have also affected the funda-
mental function of underwriting, that is the selection of risks to be
insured by an insurance company. The key to an understanding
of the underwriting mechanism is familiarity with the industry's
overall approach toward risk. A maxim frequently quoted by in-
surance executives is that you cannot choose good risks, but you
can avoid bad ones.
What insurance companies try to do is impose a predictable
distribution on any given set of risks. They do this by eliminating
outsiders, per the "avoid bad risks" maxim. They also do it by
61. Id. According to Priest, the risk classification system breaks down be-
cause the development of enterprise liability accentuates the adverse selection
problem. For a discussion of this breakdown, consider the earlier example of
fires, see supra text following note 60. For a discussion of risk classification, see
supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
62. See ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION, supra note 48, at 8-9.
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using limits and by the use of reinsurance. What frustrates liabil-
ity insurers is that in today's legal system they find it increasingly
difficult to identify "bad risks." The normal way to identify a bad
risk is through an analysis of the company's claims record, loss
control program, external developments and management. But
doctrines like joint and several liability for independent
tortfeasors and absolute liability make a sad joke out of even the
most careful underwriting.
Tort reforms which improve the predictability of the system
include restrictions on the use of the joint and several liability
doctrine and elimination of punitive damages. 63 However, it
should be noted that a predictable system is not necessarily a less
costly system. If every court awarded punitive damages at a fixed
ratio, say two times the compensatory award, the system, while
more costly, would be more predictable.
A third criterion for reviewing tort reform measures is cost,
meaning whether a given tort reform will reduce liability insur-
ance premiums.
A study performed for the American Medical Association
suggests the following savings in premiums from tort reform
measures:
1. a 12% savings from a $250,000 cap on non-eco-
nomic damages;
2. a 9% savings from a change in contingency fee sys-
tem to a sliding scale system (33.33% up to
$150,000, 25% of the next $150,000 and 10% of the
balance);
3. an 8% savings from a collateral source offset; and
4. a 6% savings from a structured settlements ap-
63. See A.B.A., Report of the American Bar Association Action Commission to Im-
prove the Tort Liability System 15-25 (Feb. 1987) [hereinafter Action Commission Re-
port]. The American Bar Association (A.B.A.) appointed the Action Commission
to examine the tort liability system and the A.B.A. published the commission's
recommendations, including those aimed at punitive damages and the doctrine
ofjoint and several liability. The Action Commission recommended narrowing
the scope of punitive damages rather than completely eliminating them. Id. at
18. The commission set forth several measures to serve that purpose, including
the encouragement of use of remittitur and additur by the judge. Id. at 20. Re-
garding joint and several liability, the commission recommended that each de-
fendant be jointly and severally liable for a plaintiff's economic loss. Id. at 24.
However, the commission recommended that a defendant whose responsibility
is substantially disproportionate to the liability for the entire loss of the plaintiff
should be held liable only for his equitable share of the plaintiff's non-economic
loss. Id.
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proach to awards. 64
A study by the Rand Institute for Civil Justice on tort reforms
implemented in the 1970's in the medical malpractice area
concludes:
1. collateral source offset reduces the number of claims
by 14% and the average size of claims by between
11% and 18%; and
2. caps on awards reduce the average size of awards by
23%.65
Businesses in countries which have a different tort system
from the United States pay a much lower rate for commercial lia-
bility insurance. For example, in Canada where there are caps on
non-economic awards, 66 penalties for frivolous suits and other
measures, 67 the average premium is one-third the size of the aver-
age premium in the United States. 68 Thus, overall there is clear
evidence that tort reform can reduce premium costs.
The fourth criterion for evaluating tort reform measures is
efficiency. Efficiency means whether a given tort reform measure
will result in the injured party receiving a higher percentage of
the dollars involved than the current 45% with the remainder go-
ing to cover legal and other transactional costs.
Reforms in the areas of contingency fees, frivolous lawsuits
and discovery abuse would definitely impact on the basic effi-
ciency of the system. If the transactions costs are reduced, then a
higher percentage of the dollars awarded will go to injured
persons.
The insurance industry has proposed a four part program for
1987, namely:
1. restrictions on punitive damages;
2. abolition of the use of the joint and several liability
doctrine;
3. modification in the collateral source rule; and
4. restoration of the state of the art defense.a)
64. MILLIMAN & ROBERTSON, ACTUARIAL ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN MFDICAL
ASSOCIATION TORT REFORM PROPOSALS (1985).
65. INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, supra note 34.
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These four proposals compare relatively favorably under the cri-
teria of justice, predictability, cost and efficiency.
1. Punitive Damages
Restricting the use of punitive damages does not at all se-
verely restrict an injured person's right to full compensation. Pu-
nitive damages are directed toward deterrence 70 and it is difficult
to argue that justice is offended if those funds are not transferred
to the plaintiff.
Eliminating punitive damages would increase the predictabil-
ity of the system. Today, the courts award punitive damages both
in terms of size and occurrence in a very unpredictable fashion. 71
The curtailing of punitive damages would reduce the cost of the
system.
On the surface, it would appear that eliminating punitive
damages would decrease the efficiency of the system by decreas-
ing the size of the award relative to the transaction costs. It is
likely that without the incentive of a large punitive damage award,
litigation expenses would decline. 72
2. Joint and Several Liability Doctrine
Changes in the joint and several liability doctrine would im-
prove the predictability and reduce the cost of the system. It is
also likely that a great deal of litigation would be reduced, thus
increasing the efficiency of the system. Under joint and several
liability, plaintiffs' attorneys attempt to seek compensation from
many sources, even when the source is only remotely connected
with the incident. 75 This involves high litigation costs for
defendants.
Under most proposals for change in the joint and several lia-
bility standard, it does not appear that justice is offended. Given
70. 4 F. HARPER, F. JAMES, JR. & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 25.5A, at
527-28 (2d ed. 1986).
71. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1981)
(trial court erred in setting aside punitive damages of $5 million); Grimshaw v.
Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 823-24, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 389-91
(1981) (not an abuse of discretion for trial court to reduce jury's award of puni-
tive damages from $125 million to $3.5 million).
72. See Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 45-46 (1982). Professor Ellis asserts that the uncertainty of the legal
standard for assessing punitive damages increases the likelihood that cases will
not be settled without litigation and appeal which increases litigation costs. Id.
73. See generally CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM, snpra note 55, at 11, 13; MUNICIPAL
LIABILITY, supra note 50, at 6-7.
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the overwhelming majority vote for the change in California law
under Proposition 5174 passed inJune, 1986, a change in the joint
and several liability doctrine did not appear to offend Californi-
ans' sense of fairness. Thus in terms of the criterion for justice, a
change of the joint and several liability doctrine cannot be viewed
as severely restricting an injured person's rights. The chief con-
cern with moving away from the joint and several liability doc-
trine as applied to independent tortfeasors is that injured persons
will receive no compensation in cases in which the principal
tortfeasor cannot be identified or is judgment proof. But, propo-
nents of the change argue that this is a societal concern, best han-
dled by first party insurance for medical care and disability or by
government programs. Using the tort system for providing cov-
erage is unfair-the deep pocket ends up paying for the sins of
the empty pockets. Further, as reviewed above, it leads to a
breakdown in the tort and insurance mechanisms. 75
3. Collateral Source Rule
Because many injured parties are covered by first-party insur-
ance or by government insurance programs, the compensation
from a tort case may result in more compensation than the injury
merits. In states where the so-called collateral source rule is ap-
plied, the courts may not take these "collateral sources" into ac-
count, either as evidence or in deciding compensation. 76" The
insurance industry is advocating a change in this rule to allow for
consideration of collateral source payments. 77
The proposed change in the collateral source rule would not
restrict any injured person's rights to full compensation. Thus,
the change satisfies the justice criterion.
The change would not be expected to have a major impact on
predictability, except perhaps through slowing the growth in the
size of awards. The change would reduce costs because double
payment for the same injury would be reduced. As a rule of evi-
dence, the collateral source rule could serve to improve in an
overall way the operations of the tort system by moving the sys-
tem back towards a standard where liability is based on fault.
In the universe of accidents there are two clear extremes. On
one side are accidents where nobody or only the injured party is
74. CAL.. CIv. CODE §§ 1431.1-1431.5 (West Supp. 1987).
75. For further discussion, see supra notes 1-16 and accompanying text.
76. See Action Commision Report, supra note 63.
77. See CIVilJuSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 55, at 1, 14.
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at fault; on the other end of the spectrum are accidents where
somebody other than the injured party is clearly and obviously at
fault. If driver A runs a red light and hits a pedestrian, then
driver A is clearly at fault. If driver A runs a red light and runs
into a truck, then, under normal circumstances, driver A is the
only one at fault. However, what if the driver of the truck was
going 70 mph in a 35 mph speed limit area? What if the lights on
the corner had been known to stay red on two previous occa-
sions? What if the truck driver was drunk, after being served li-
quor at the local bar?
This is a grey area between the two extremes and the courts
must establish who is liable. Now consider the situation in which
driver A is paralyzed for the rest of his life. Driver A sues the
local municipality for negligent operation of the light. In the
courtroom, the jury sees driver A in a wheelchair and hears the
medical testimony on the amount of medical care dollars driver A
will need for the rest of his life. The jury hears no evidence on
collateral sources. The jury's human instincts will push them in
the direction of trying to find fault in order to get compensation
for the injured person. The members of the jury will be inclined
to find the municipality liable so that driver A is compensated.
On the other hand, if the jury knew that collateral sources were
adequate, the jury would be less inclined to find the municipality
at fault. In other words, the question of collateral sources goes to
the root of the trend away from a fault based system, rather than
just the issue of overcompensation.
On an arithmetic basis, the recognition of collateral sources
would reduce the efficiency of the system since fewer dollars
would be going to the plaintiff, while litigation expense probably
would not be changed significantly. But this would only occur in
cases in which there would have been unjust overcompensation.
4. State-of-the-Art Defense
There are three major variations of the state-of-the-art de-
fense. 7a The state-of-the-art defense can mean that a defendant
should not be liable, if he or she was unaware of the defect, be-
cause the defect was not discovered or discoverable, given the
state of technology at the time. 7 T A second variation emphasizes
the general practice and knowledge in the industry at the time of
78. See generally AM. B. FOUND., FORT REFORM AND RELATED PROPOSALS
(1979).
79. Id.
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manufacture. Under this interpretation the defendant could
claim that the industry was generally unaware of the problem. 0
A third interpretation would absolve a manufacturer from liability
if it had conformed with industry practice at the time. 81
Related to the state-of-the-art defense is the defense of com-
pliance with government standards. Drug manufacturers, in par-
ticular, state that, where a drug has been exhaustively tested by
the United States Food and Drug Administration and given its
approval, the drug manufacturer should not be liable. 82
The state-of-the-art defense would not appear to severely re-
strict people's rights. There will be cases where people claim in-
jury by products which have been certified as safe by the federal
government. 83 As technology develops, particularly in the medi-
cal field, products first considered harmless or even beneficial are
later viewed as dangerous.8 4 Such events can be covered by pri-
vate or government first-party insurance.
The state-of-the-art defense plays a critical role in insurance
because it provides a motivation for the insured to improve safety
and thus aids in the underwriting process, through improving
predictability. An underwriter can check to see whether a firm is
employing state-of-the-art safety measures and thus has a basis
for the selection of risks.
If the state-of-the-art defense is available, businesses will be
motivated to develop products and services which comply with
this standard. As a result, their exposure to suit will be reduced
and this will be reflected in the cost of insurance. The state-of-
the-art defense would tend to bring down the costs of liability in-
surance, since with this defense available fewer claims would be
paid or litigated.
The efficiency of the system could deteriorate, again in an
arithmetic sense. Doctrines of strict or absolute liability tend to
reduce litigation, because liability is easier to prove under these
doctrines. However, if the standard of liability was clearer there
could be a significant decline in the litigation expense of defend-
ants. Much effort is spent on defense litigation, when the defend-
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Cigarette smoking is the best example of a product first considered
harmless and now viewed as dangerous. At one time, advertisements referred to
cigarette smoking as "just what the doctor ordered." See Fein, Capital s Smoking
Court Stirs Groans and Cheers, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1987, at 30, col. 1.
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ant cannot know whether the court will adopt a standard of
liability other than the current one.
V. CONCLUSION
The proposals for tort reform discussed so far have a com-
mon theme-namely, they return the tort system closer to a fault-
based orientation. In addition, as legislative proposals, they fulfill
a further function of codifying the common law. In other words,
the legislative proposals by their very nature suggest a weakness
in the case law system. Judges and juries in today's society have
no special background or training to decide fundamental societal
issues on risk, fault and compensation. These are issues for the
whole of society and should be debated and legislated in a fully
informed democratic procedure. While a full codification cannot
be realistically expected, such steps along the way should improve
the efficiency and justice of the liability system.
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